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In this article we explain how actors’ ability to bargain successfully in order to advance their 
institutional preferences has changed over time as a function of the particular institutional context. We 
show how actors use their bargaining power under given institutional rules in order to shift the existing 
balance between legislation and delegation, and shift the rules governing delegation in their favour, 
between formal treaty changes. We argue that a collective actor’s preferences over delegation is a 
function of whether the actor has more ability to influence policy through delegation or through 
legislation. We go on to argue that the degree to which a specific actor’s preferences can prevail (in a 
setting in which different actors have different preferences) will depend upon its bargaining power 
under existing institutional rules, i.e. its ability to impede or veto policy in order to change the division 
between legislation and delegation and the rules of delegation. Our primary focus in this article is on 
choice over procedure; i.e. the battles over whether or not delegation or legislation should be 
employed.  We maintain a secondary focus on change in procedure, examining how different 
procedures of comitology have come into being and been removed from the table. We examine the 
evolution of the debate over comitology and implementation, over five key periods. We scrutinize how 
actors within these periods seek to shift the balance of legislation and delegation and the rules of 
delegation according to their preferences. Our conclusions assess our empirical findings on the basis 
of our model. 
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Introduction
* 
Why has delegated authority been the subject of so much controversy in the European Union (EU)? 
This question is at the heart of the debates about the relationship between member state authority and 
supranational organization that have dominated EU studies over the last four decades. The EU 
legislative process, i.e. the process of creating laws and regulations at the EU level, provides for the 
possibility both of legislation and delegation. Legislation is directly based on a provision of the treaty 
and specifies appropriate rules and measures within the legislative item in question. Delegation 
consists of delegated rule making authority to the Commission or, more rarely, the Council, and relates 
indirectly to a treaty provision. The balance between legislation and delegation and the appropriate 
forms of control over delegation have long been contested issues between the Commission, the 
Council and the Parliament. In this article we examine how the division between legislation and 
delegation
1 and the control over delegation among these actors has shifted between formal treaty changes. 
Recent work has sought to understand delegation in terms of principal-agent theory, borrowing 
from the literature on relations between Congress and agencies in the US. The emphasis of much of 
this work has been on how the principals (primarily the member states) can reduce ‘delegation slack,’ 
the ability of agents to pursue their own interests rather than the interests of principals. Recently, this 
literature has begun to focus on the subject of ‘comitology,’ committee structures created by the 
Council of EU Member States to supervise and control the European Commission’s exercise of its 
implementing powers.  
In a recent article, Ballman et al. (2002: 556) claim that ‘the Commission and the Parliament have 
always strongly opposed the Council’s practice of setting up comitology committees.’ The empirical 
evidence suggests otherwise. At certain conjunctures, the Commission welcomed the extension of 
comitology procedures that allow the Council to exercise some influence. The Parliament has often 
been more extreme in its demands for rolling back comitology than the Commission, even though the 
latter appears to be more directly affected. Nevertheless, the Parliament has for a long time sought to 
gain access to comitology procedures. 
In this article, we start from a set of arguments about actors’ preferences, and seek to explain how 
actors’ ability to bargain successfully in order to advance these preferences has changed over time as a 
function of the particular institutional context. We show how actors use their bargaining power under 
given institutional rules at a particular moment in time in order to shift the existing balance between 
legislation and delegation, and shift the rules governing delegation in their favour, between formal 
treaty changes. We argue  that a collective actor’s preferences over delegation are a function of 
whether the actor has more ability to influence policy through delegation or through legislation. We 
furthermore predict that the degree to which a specific actor’s preferences can prevail (in a setting in 
which different actors have different preferences) will depend upon its bargaining power under 
existing institutional rules, i.e. its ability to impede or veto policy in order to change the division 
between legislation and delegation and the rules of delegation (Héritier and Farrell 2003). Our primary 
focus in this article is on choice over procedure; i.e. the battles over whether or not delegation or 
legislation should be employed. We maintain a secondary focus on change in procedure, examining 
how different procedures of comitology have come into being and been removed from the table. 
We start by providing a brief overview of relations between Council, Commission and Parliament 
in the areas of legislation and delegation. We then set out assumptions covering actors’ preferences 
over legislation and delegation, and develop hypotheses about their ability to act upon those 
preferences. Next, we examine the evolution of the debate over comitology and implementation over 
five key periods. We scrutinize how actors within these periods seek to shift the balance of legislation 
and delegation and the rules of delegation according to their preferences. The periods start with the 
origins of comitology and the ‘empty chair’ crisis, the development of comitology during the ‘dark Carl-Fredrik Bergström, Henry Farrell and Adrienne Héritier 
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ages’ of European integration, and the consequences of the Single European Act and Maastricht and 
Amsterdam Treaties. Our conclusions assess our empirical findings on the basis of our model. 
Relations among legislative actors, and the comitology system 
The three key actors in the European Union’s legislative process are the Council, the European 
Commission and the European Parliament.
2 The Council has traditionally been the dominant actor; it 
formally represents member state interests. Depending on the Treaty base of the issue in question, it 
may accept or reject legislation proposed by the Commission on the basis of unanimity, or a qualified 
majority vote. It may only modify the Commission’s proposal on the basis of unanimity among 
member states. The Council is able to exercise considerable control over the Commission’s 
implementation of policy through so-called comitology procedures (see below). 
The European Commission acts to initiate legislation by making proposals to the (as well as to the 
Parliament in many areas of policy after the introduction of codecision).  It is also charged with 
fleshing out the details of regulations and implementation.  
Finally, the Parliament has traditionally been the weakest of the three, but has recently seen quite 
considerable increases in its competences. Originally, the Parliament only had the right to be consulted 
on legislation; neither Council nor Commission needed to take heed of its opinions, and typically 
neither did. However, it came to have some control over the European Union’s budget, and, after the 
Maastricht Treaty, a greatly expanded role in the legislative process. The introduction of the legislative 
procedure of ‘codecision’ put it on a much stronger legislative footing in many policy areas, in which 
it became effectively co-equal with the Council. The Parliament has also had responsibility for 
supervising the Commission from the beginnings of the European Union. Formally, the Commission is 
responsible to the Parliament rather than the Council; the Parliament may call individual 
Commissioners to account, and may vote to dismiss the Commission. However, the Parliament has 
only moderate effective influence over the comitology system (although its influence has increased 
over time). 
Much important policy in the European Union is conducted on the basis of delegation to the 
Commission (or other policy actors). Many Directives and Regulations are relatively loosely specified, 
and provide the Commission with the power to arrive at rules and decisions that will lend specificity to 
the broad heads of legislation. Article 202 (ex. 145) of the Treaty spells out the right of the Council to 
‘confer on the Commission, in the acts which the Council adopts, powers for the implementation of 
the rules which the Council lays down.’ The Council also may ‘impose certain requirements in respect 
of the exercise of these powers’, provided that these rules are ‘consonant with principles and rules to 
be laid down in advance by the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and 
after obtaining the Opinion of the European Parliament.’ 
These Treaty articles are notable both for what they do say, and what they do not. First, they very 
clearly identify the right to confer implementing powers as resting with the Council, rather than with 
the Council and Parliament. Second, they provide the Council with explicit authority to lay down the 
conditions under which the Commission exercises its delegated authority. Third, they do not specify 
those requirements, instead merely requiring that they be consonant with rules and principles laid 
down previously by the Council. 
These Treaty rules (which date from the Single European Act) partially reflect principles that were 
reached through interstitial bargaining over previous decades. The principle that the Commission had 
to cooperate with oversight procedures laid down by the Council dates back to the founding of the 
Community, and was first formally articulated in 1961 in the field of foreign commercial policy. The 
requirement that procedures be consonant with ‘rules and principles to be laid down in advance’ is a 
later innovation, recognizing an acceptance by the Council that it should choose among a limited 
number of fixed procedures rather than creating ad-hoc solutions as it saw fit. This is a moderate Legislate or Delegate? Bargaining over Implementation and Legislative Authority in the European Union 
EUI-WP RSCAS No. 2006/42 © 2006 Carl-Fredrik Bergström, Henry Farrell and Adrienne Héritier  3 
limitation of the Council’s power of choice. Nonetheless, one can observe two key features of the 
Treaty Texts. First, they preserve a high degree of flexibility over choice of procedure. In contrast to 
legislation, the Treaty does not specify which procedure should be associated with which policy area. 
Thus, there is little scope for Parliament or Commission to exploit the kinds of ‘procedural politics’ 
that they have in the legislative process (Jupille 2004). Second, it reserves a primary role for the 
Council in determining which procedures should be applied in a given instance.  
There are three main types of committee procedure. First are advisory committees, the weakest 
variety, in which the committee’s vote is not binding on the Commission. However, the Commission 
is supposed to take ‘utmost account’ of the committee’s opinion, and inform the committee of how it 
has lived up to this obligation. 
Second are management committees. If the Commission adopts an implementing measure that a 
management committee disagrees with, the Commission must forward the measure to the Council, 
which may then modify or annul it. In one variant of this committee form, the Commission must also 
suspend the measure while it is on appeal to the Council. 
Finally, regulatory committees, in their basic variant, have an extra filet or ‘safety net.’ With these 
committees, the Commission is only able to adopt its envisaged rules if the committee explicitly 
approves. Should the committee not approve, or not be able to agree (on the basis of a qualified 
majority), then the Commission has to submit a proposal to the Council almost as if it were a proposal 
for legislation.
3 If the Council, however, cannot reach a decision within a certain period of time, the 
Commission can proceed as it had originally planned. These committees have come to be used in 
situations in which the Commission was adopting long term implementing rules rather than short term 
measures. A more restrictive variant of the regulatory committee, which is no longer applied, not only 
had a filet but a contre-filet (double safety net). Under this procedure, the Council (within a foreseen 
period of time) could stop the Commission from acting on the basis of a simple majority vote, even 
after the expiry of the relevant period, and even if the Council could not agree on an alternative measure. 
The theoretical argument 
The key EU legislative actors have a fundamental choice over desired policy measures—whether to 
introduce them through legislation or delegation. This in part turns on questions of transaction costs 
(Epstein and O’Halloran 1999)—overly detailed legislation may prove impossible to shepherd through 
the legislative process without high side-payments. Thus, it may be appropriate to supplement 
framework legislation with delegation of ex post rulemaking and implementation powers. However, 
the decision over whether to delegate or to regulate is also fundamentally a political decision. 
Different procedures will have different implications for the overall distribution of political influence. 
Different actors will have different levels of control over the procedures of legislation and delegation.  
We argue that actors’ preferences over delegation are determined by the degree to which they have 
effective influence over policy that takes place through delegation as opposed to legislation. We argue 
that actors are competence-maximizers—that is, they will seek to ensure that policy will be enacted 
through procedures which maximize their own degree of control over the process of policy-making, 
and not through procedures where they have little or no control. As a result, in policy arguments, they 
will press for the widespread use of procedures that favour their own interests, and for less frequent 
use (and, where possible, the alteration or abandonment) of those procedures that do not. Moreover, 
we argue that, given a formal distribution of competences in legislation and delegation, actors will try 
to shift the decision-making weight in their favour between treaty revisions, be it by changing the 
division between legislation and delegation or by changing the rules governing delegation. Whether 
they are successful in doing so depends on how the given formal institutional rules at that particular 
moment affect their relative bargaining power, reflected in their sensitivity to delay (their time 
horizons) and to failure of negotiations.  Carl-Fredrik Bergström, Henry Farrell and Adrienne Héritier 
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In the European Union, given the distribution of competences described in the previous section, we 
predict that the relevant collective actors will typically have the following preferences over delegation. 
The Council will prefer extensive delegation to the Commission, along with extensive control by 
the member states. This allows it to minimize transaction costs by delegating authority to a specialized 
policy actor—but also to ensure that this specialized actor does not deviate from its preferences. It 
will, however, be strongly opposed to forms of delegation that might allow the Commission to escape 
member state control. 
The Commission will in general prefer extensive delegation, without control of member states or 
with only minimal control from the member states. However, its preferences will to some extent 
depend on the availability of alternative forms of policy making through legislation. Even though 
much previous work on comitology has treated the Commission only as an implementer of policy; the 
Commission has both the ability to propose as well as to implement legislation. Thus, in periods in 
which the Commission has difficulty proposing legislation that will be successfully adopted, it will be 
more amenable to extensive member state controls on delegation than it otherwise would be. 
The European Parliament will prefer minimal delegation with minimal control by the member 
states. This means that policy will be conducted primarily through the legislative process—but that 
where it is delegated, the Commission will more likely be influenced by the Parliament than by the 
Council. While the Commission is in theory responsible to the Parliament, in practice the Parliament is 
better able to influence legislation than delegated acts; at least since the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) gave some teeth to its powers of consultation. 
Thus, we argue that the preferences of the actors over delegation will be a function of the existing 
distribution of competences and given institutional rules, but also that it may change within these 
parameters as the attractiveness (or lack of same) of pursuing legislation changes. For example, when 
the Commission is confronted with a Council which makes legislative decisions under the unanimity 
rule, it will prefer delegation, which is likely to allow it more freedom in shaping policy. In a situation 
in which the Commission is confronted with a Council that decides on legislation through qualified 
majority voting, we expect the Commission to be more favourable towards legislation. 
In order to understand how preferences translate into outcomes we employ the analytic narrative 
strategy.
4 This allows us to reconstruct the processes that led to the division between legislation and 
delegation and the rules governing delegation during five specific periods in the EU’s history. In order 
to construct these narratives, we turn to a rich body of empirical evidence covering the last fifty years, 
primarily based on the analysis of archival documents and interviews as well as the analysis of 
secondary literature.
5 Specifically, we examine the inter-organizational debates and strategic 
interaction surrounding delegation, through the analysis of public statements and actions made by 
Council (including member states), Commission, and European Parliament. We divide up these 
debates and actions into five major phases, corresponding to the periods between the key moments of 
institutional change in the European Union. These phases constitute our cases. We do not account for 
how the formal treaty changes came about, but take them as a given at the beginning of each period we 
analyze. Starting out from different formal starting conditions (unanimity, QMV, increased power of 
the Parliament) we seek to reconstruct the processes of bargaining over legislation and delegation in 
these periods based on the interactions between the Council, Commission, the Parliament and the 
European Court. 
We reconstruct actors’ preferences on the basis of these structures, and then seek to analyze the 
processes through which preferences were translated into outcomes. We invoke a common 
mechanism—bargaining—to explain how preferences—given specific institutional rules—translate 
into outcomes at each stage. Actors’ bargaining strength will ultimately depend on the credible threats 
to impede or veto legislative measures that they may make to back up their arguments.
6 In order to 
make such a threat, the actor in question has to (a) have the de facto ability to impede or (even better) Legislate or Delegate? Bargaining over Implementation and Legislative Authority in the European Union 
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to block specific items of legislation, and (b) be less sensitive to the impeding or blockage of the 
legislation in question than the other relevant actors.  
Thus we predict that over time, as the bargaining options that are open to actors change with altered 
formal institutional rules at the Treaty level which in turn influence their preferences depending on the 
extent to which they can exert more influence on policy through delegation rather than legislation, or 
vice-versa), so too will their ability to prevail in conflicts over the degree and kind of delegation that 
takes place. This will be reflected in their success (or lack of same) in changing the extent or rules of 
delegation between treaty changes. 
However, even if there is a common mechanism, the stakes of bargaining are somewhat different in 
the five periods under examination. In the first period—in which procedures of oversight for 
delegation first came into being—actors bargained over the general rules that would spell out the 
Treaty provisions over delegation, and thus allow control of the Commission’s powers of 
implementation. In the second period, actors bargained over new kinds of committee structure and 
rules, and how they should be implemented. In the third, actors bargained over whether there should 
be procedures governing choice of committees, and informal rules involving the European 
Parliament’s access to information, culminating in the First Comitology Decision. In the fourth, there 
were disputes over the relative extent of delegation and legislation, over choice of committee, and the 
Parliament’s right to information. In the fifth, there were negotiations over whether the Parliament 
should have control over comitology, and over choice of committee, culminating in the Second 
Comitology Decision. 
The empirical cases 
From the beginnings of comitology in CAP to the Luxembourg Compromise 
How do our arguments explain the battles surrounding the birth of the comitology system? The 
institutional rules and division of competences regarding implementation were minimal and 
ambiguous in this period, so that actors had very considerable incentives to try to carve out as 
extensive a set of competences as possible. In the early years of the EU, the Council perceived the 
need to delegate powers of decision making to the Commission in order to reduce transaction costs but 
was unsure of the best way to do this, while retaining control over the process. The circumstances 
under which powers of implementation could be delegated to the Commission were not clearly spelled 
out in the Treaty of Rome, the foundational text of the European Union. Article 155 of the Treaty 
[Article 155 EEC] stated that ‘[i]n order to ensure the proper functioning and development of the 
common market, the Commission shall (…) exercise the powers conferred on it by the Council for the 
implementation of the rules laid down by the latter.’ However, it did not elaborate how and when the 
Council should confer these powers or how the Commission could be held accountable.  
As noted in the previous section, we argue that the Council prefers delegation—but only under 
extensive member state control. The Commission, in contrast, will desire forms of delegation that 
increases its effective influence over policy—high levels of delegation without Council control or 
delegation with minimal Council control. The Parliament, which at this point had little power over the 
legislative process, and no role in delegation, but some powers of oversight over the Commission, 
would have been opposed to delegation because it impinged upon its right of oversight of the 
Commission. It would thus only have been interested in delegation if this indirectly increased its own 
powers. We would expect the main battle to have taken place between Commission and Council on 
terms that strongly favoured the Council; the Parliament, which had no effective veto or power to 
impede legislation, would only have played an indirect and minor role in the negotiations.  
Implementation and accountability were especially problematic in agriculture, a key policy area for 
the nascent European Union. Soon after the Treaty had entered into force, the Commission was invited 
to make policy proposals by the member states on the implementation of the Common Agricultural Carl-Fredrik Bergström, Henry Farrell and Adrienne Héritier 
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Policy (CAP). The Commission sought to use the lack of specific rules regarding implementation to 
give itself extensive powers under delegation. In its initial proposals, the Commission sought to 
become the central actor in implementing the CAP, and to give itself considerable leeway to make 
policy independently. In 1959, it proposed the creation of several European Offices to implement the 
details of agricultural policy, and to pursue a dialogue with both governmental and nongovernmental 
bodies through Consultative Committees.
7 In response, member states, which had effective veto 
power, created their own national offices to implement policy instead of the Commission (Fennell 1979). 
However, member states in turn depended on the Commission for implementation.
8 Therefore, the 
member states began to discuss how they might monitor and influence the Commission’s decisions 
more effectively than through the proposed Consultative Committees, across a variety of policy areas. 
In 1960,
9 the Commission suggested a modified version of Consultative Committees, the Directors’ 
Committees, which would only have member state representation, taking the member states concern 
into account. The Commission would be obliged to consult them, but would not be bound by their opinion. 
The member states were not prepared to accept this proposal but had difficulty in agreeing on an 
appropriate alternative mechanism. France proposed far-reaching independent Management 
Committees that would have all but deprived the Commission of its powers of independent decision-
making. This proved a step too far in the opposite direction for other member states. Instead, the 
Special Committee on Agriculture, a body set up by the member states, suggested in 1961, that the 
Commission should take measures of ‘a practical nature’ if they corresponded to the opinion of the 
Management Committee. Otherwise, it would either have to accept the opinion of the Committee, or 
make a proposal to the Council. This was not accepted by member states that wished to preserve the 
prerogatives of the Commission. A final solution was agreed when Walter Hallstein, then President of 
the Commission, suggested that the Commission should have the power to adopt measures relating to 
day-to-day administration, but should make its intentions known in advance to the Management 
Committees. The Commission would alert the Council, should the Management Committees 
disapprove, which would then have one month to decide whether it wished to block the measure in 
question. If the Council did not come to a decision within one month, the measure would 
automatically apply. 
This compromise gave the Commission considerable leeway in implementation, and went further 
than some member states would have liked. Nonetheless, it was agreed to by the Council in 1961. 
Both the Council and the Commission were eager to reach a swift resolution and avoid a confrontation 
with the Parliament, which had forwarded a Resolution protesting against the introduction of ‘new 
organs’ without the Parliament being consulted.
10 Although the Parliament could not block a Council 
decision, the Council wished to avoid lengthy debates on the Commission’s responsibilities towards 
Parliament, and accordingly accepted the Commission’s proposals with little further ado. While the 
new procedure was only provisional, and subject to review, it proved a long lasting compromise, and 
the basis of a system of supervisory committees that came to be applied outside the area of agriculture. 
This was effectively the birth of the comitology procedure. 
The fears of the European Parliament were justified. The creation of Managerial Committees 
deviated from the lines of responsibility laid down in the Treaty. In formal terms, the Commission was 
accountable to the Parliament alone. However, the system of Managerial Committees allowed the 
Council to hold the Commission responsible for its implementation of Community legislation. The 
Parliament feared that these Committees would blur responsibility, so that it would be difficult for the 
Parliament to hold the Commission to account.
11  
However, the Commission’s aggressive pursuit of an increased policy role in general and in 
particular in delegation proved to be its downfall, leading to the famous ‘empty chair’ crisis, in which 
France temporarily withdrew from the Council. The consequent restrictions on qualified majority 
voting involved in the Luxembourg compromise, should be understood as responses to the attempt of 
the Commission to overstep its authority.
12  Legislate or Delegate? Bargaining over Implementation and Legislative Authority in the European Union 
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France’s withdrawal from the Council and Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) 
meetings was at least in part motivated by its more general worries about the Commission’s 
aspirations to greater political power.
13 In particular, De Gaulle feared that the Commission would be 
virtually uncontrollable when qualified majority voting was extended, with especially serious 
implications for the delegation of powers:  
The Commission often proposes to the Council decisions which, instead of dealing with the 
substance of the problems posed, merely give the Commission powers to act later but without 
specifying the measures which it will take if such powers are conferred upon it (…) True, in 
certain sectors (...) the Council can intervene at executive level through (…) the Management 
Committees. However, it must be noted that (…) the Commissions is endeavoring to replace the 
Management Committees by simple Advisory Committees which have no hold over it (…).
14 
The impending introduction of QMV would make it much easier for the Commission to create 
coalitions among member states for legislation that would free its hands at the implementation stage.  
Following extensive discussions among the member states in January 1966, a compromise was 
reached. The ‘Luxembourg compromise’ most famously spoke to the issue of QMV within the 
Council (Moravcsik 1998). However, its direct consequences for relations between the Council and 
Commission were equally important. The Council formulated a set of ‘methods of cooperation’ with 
the Commission that closely reflected France’s preferences, and structured the Council’s future 
treatment of the Commission. France’s concerns about the Commission’s implementing powers were 
also addressed; the Council reiterated that the formal responsibility for defining the rules of delegation 
in the management committees lay with member states.
15 The Council’s ‘methods,’ together with its 
more rigorous attitude to implementing powers, served to clip the Commission’s wings over the next 
several years. The Commission was forced to renounce its aspirations towards major political power, 
and to adhere much more closely to member states’ wishes and aspirations.  
The Parliament again voiced vociferous objections to the Council’s new procedures, which it saw 
as encroaching on its rights to supervise the Commission.
16 However, its protests were entirely 
ineffectual; the Parliament had no way to make others listen to it, since it could not credibly threaten 
action that would have had serious consequences for the Council. 
Thus, preferences over competences, and the respective bargaining strength of the involved actors, 
in the given context of formal institutional rules,  provides us with significant insight into the 
development of the rules of delegation in this first phase. Each actor—under the given formal 
institutional rules—sought to make institutional gains, and succeeded or failed according to its ability 
to make credible threats. The Council—as predicted—was prepared to delegate its powers, but only if 
it could maintain effective control of the Commission. Despite the Parliament’s and Commission’s 
wishes, it could institute implementation committees that allowed it such control; it had far greater 
bargaining strength than the other two actors. Thus, it rejected early Commission proposals that would 
have allowed the Commission a relatively free rein in implementing policy, in favour of more direct 
forms of control. The Commission was also enthusiastic for more implementation; but on its own 
terms. It sought to weaken the controls of the member states on its freedom of action, knowing that the 
Council depended on it both for implementation and to propose legislation. The Parliament was 
unequivocally opposed to forms of implementation that it would have little direct say over. To the 
extent that the Commission became locked into direct relationships of responsibility towards the 
Council, the Parliament’s scanty role in the political process would be further curtailed.  
In the negotiation of the institutional rules governing comitology, the Council prevailed because of 
its stronger veto powers vis à vis the Commission and the Parliament, and a more extensive set of fall 
back options. It therefore had considerable leeway in determining the general circumstances under 
which delegation would take place. It was difficult for the Commission to push for greater delegation 
using its right of initiative—the unanimity rule meant that the lowest common denominator of member 
state preferences was likely to prevail. Member states, under the leadership of France, blocked the 
introduction of QMV, which would have given the Commission greater leeway in implementation.  Carl-Fredrik Bergström, Henry Farrell and Adrienne Héritier 
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From the Luxembourg Compromise to the Single European Act  
Which forms of delegation developed under the conditions of the Luxembourg compromise? As 
before, we note the very considerable veto power of member states, and how it applied even more 
stringently in a context in which Council decision making was to take place under unanimity for the 
foreseeable future. We therefore expect that the Commission would have been more amenable to 
delegated powers—even where those powers had substantial restrictions placed on them—than in the 
previous period, although it would try where possible to reinterpret the rules covering delegation to its 
own liking. Delegated powers might have been thin gruel but were greatly preferable to legislation that 
was likely to be blocked. Further, we predict that the Council, with a high degree of control over 
legislation would only have been willing to delegate under strict conditions—i.e. in cases in which it 
had extensive control over the delegation process. The Parliament would have little to gain from 
delegation to the Commission, since such delegation would have involved an increase in the Council’s 
influence over the Commission, and a corresponding decrease in that of the Parliament. However, as 
in the previous period, given the existing formal institutional rules, it would have had little bargaining 
strength to influence other actors. The Commission too would have had relatively little bargaining 
leverage—it had an effective choice between no policy (which would have undermined its legitimacy 
and viability as a political organization) or policy processes which reflected the member states’ desire 
for control. The Council, finally, would have been in a very strong bargaining position. 
As matters transpired, continued blockages in the legislative process led to a renewed emphasis on 
delegated powers. However, given the strong bargaining position of the Council, these new forms of 
delegation went together with the extension of comitology as a means for member states to monitor 
and curtail the Commission’s use of delegated powers. This applied to the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) in which nearly all Regulations invoked the need for the Commission to comply with the 
opinion of management committees. Such committees also came to be a regular feature in other policy 
areas in which the Commission had significant delegated powers. The Council demanded the right not 
only to be consulted, but to constrain and to control (Bertram 1967). 
New forms of oversight came into being. So-called ‘regulatory committees’ were created by the 
Council to monitor the Commission’s behaviour in the politically salient areas of trade policy.
17 A 
second variant was introduced in the politically sensitive field of veterinary protection (veterinary 
standards were often employed to protect domestic markets). Member states allowed the Commission 
to reject member state legislation only under the condition that a Standing Veterinary Committee be 
created that would allow the member states to exercise collective oversight of the Commission’s 
actions. After long discussions, the member states decided to employ a regulatory committee that not 
only had a filet, but a contre-filet (double safety net).  
These measures provided the Commission with new—but clearly restricted—powers. However, 
formal legislation as a means to influence policy was even less attractive under the Luxembourg 
compromise, since Council decisions were made ‘as if’ on the basis of unanimity, and the Commission 
had little ability to deviate from the lowest common denominator of member state preferences. 
Consequently, the Commission was prepared to accept more stringent controls as the necessary price 
for an increased role in implementation.
18 
The Parliament had no such interest in compromise—while it only had tenuous influence over 
legislation, it feared that the little influence that it had was being rendered less relevant by the new 
emphasis on delegated powers. In a series of resolutions and reports,
19 the Parliament expressed its 
worries that highly important political matters were being dealt with through implementation in a non-
transparent manner. It therefore passed a formal resolution to the effect that it should be consulted 
whenever important matters were being handled through delegation.
20 It furthermore demanded that 
committees should only be accorded a consultative role, and not encroach upon the Commission’s 
rights and responsibilities. The Commission’s President, Jean Rey, in response to the Parliament’s 
resolution, argued that:  Legislate or Delegate? Bargaining over Implementation and Legislative Authority in the European Union 
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[t]he powers of the Commission are increasing for a very simple reason (...): we have left the 
period of construction to enter the period of management of common policies. However normal it 
may be for decisions relating to construction to be taken by the Governments in the Council by 
unanimity, the daily administration of politics relating to tariffs, trade, agriculture, evidently 
requires an organ with sufficient powers… I do not believe that we can step back since the obvious 
necessity, by contrast, is to reinforce these powers with reasonable precautions.
21 
However, the reports and resolutions of the Parliament did not affect the extent and rules of 
delegation. Without the ability to impede or block decision-making in legislation or delegation, the 
Parliament could not make any difference. When Britain, Denmark and Ireland became member states, 
the institution of the national veto became even more strongly entrenched, with knock-on 
consequences for decision-making. The EU’s decision-making machinery was becoming increasingly 
dysfunctional. In June 1974, the member states agreed in Paris that not all decisions should be 
conditional on unanimous agreement, and that more power should be delegated to the Commission. 
Given these increased political transaction costs, the so-called Tindemans report reaffirmed the 
importance of QMV, and the delegation of powers: ‘there is one principle which… is essential: that of 
the delegation of executive powers. Delegation must become the general rule if we wish to develop 
that degree of efficiency which is vital to the institutional system.
22‘  
Over the next several years, renewed efforts to unblock decision making in the Council, and to 
delegate more authority to the Commission had mixed success. Thus, in 1978, the Commission re-
launched the debate with the ‘Fresco’ report which argued both for an extension of QMV, and more 
delegation of powers to the Commission.
23 The report also suggested that the Commission should 
exercise ‘administrative’ and ‘executive’ powers (Art. 155), without prior authorization from the 
Council, although the Council would still be able to reserve a decision to itself when a matter was too 
politically sensitive. Here the Commission clearly sought to interpret the existing institutional rules in 
such a way as to expand its own powers in comitology. 
Although the Council recognized that there were continuing problems with delegation, it was 
unimpressed with the Commission’s radical (and self-serving) suggestions, and commissioned a group 
of senior European statesmen (‘The Three Wise Men’) to come up with alternative proposals not 
requiring Treaty changes. This report suggested that voting become the norm, so that member states, if 
they wished to invoke a veto, should do so explicitly. They also pointed to increasing difficulties in 
delegation; the plethora of supervisory committees was cumbersome and often the object of dispute 
between Council and Commission. However, as they noted:  
When the Community moves into a new area of action, States find it difficult to anticipate all of 
the problems that may arise in execution; apparently small practical implementing decisions could 
create political difficulties or alter the impact of the policy itself in unforeseen ways. Hence the 
reluctance of some States to delegate any implementing powers to the Commission unless some 
kind of emergency procedure for dealing with cases of political difficulty can be agreed. And if 
anxieties of this kind are not satisfied, no delegation will take place at all.
24  
Thus, in this period from the Luxembourg compromise until the Single European Act, the Council 
began to increasingly rely on delegation as a means of making policy in a context in which unanimity 
governed the legislative process. However, as we expected, it did so on the basis of stringent oversight 
procedures. The new comitology procedures that were established all clearly reflect the superior 
bargaining power of the Council in negotiating the institutional set up of the procedures with the 
Commission and the Parliament. While the Commission would have preferred a less restrictive 
approach, it was prepared to accept an expansion of the comitology system with restrictions as the 
necessary corollary to increased use of delegation. Given the blockages in the legislative process, it 
had little choice. However, it did try to ease the restrictions imposed by the Council and to create 
impetus towards less restrictive forms of delegation by issuing a report pin-pointing the weaknesses of 
current practices.
25 The Parliament, for its part had nothing to gain from an expansion of delegation 
and made its hostility known. However, its lack of power in the legislative process meant that its 
reports and resolutions condemning the increased role of comitology went largely ignored by the other actors. Carl-Fredrik Bergström, Henry Farrell and Adrienne Héritier 
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From the Single European Act to the Maastricht Treaty 
The next period, which lasted from the Single European Act of 1987 (SEA) to the Maastricht Treaty, 
took place in a very different institutional context. The unanimity requirement had been eased in a 
number of important policy areas. New institutional rules of decision-making also marked the 
beginning of a new phase in the relationship between legislation and delegation. The SEA provided for 
qualified majority voting in a variety of areas relating to the creation of the Single Market, a political 
project aimed at removing barriers to the free movement of economic assets within the EU. It thus 
paved the way for a significant increase in the power of the Commission in the legislative arena; the 
Commission’s legislative proposals were no longer stymied by the Luxembourg Compromise. The 
Parliament, for its part, received a somewhat greater role in the legislative process, thanks to a new 
legislative procedure, cooperation, which gave it an enhanced voice in legislation (although it gave it 
relatively little power to veto legislation). However, contrary to the hopes of the Commission and the 
Parliament, the SEA did not grant the former special powers to adopt implementing legislation for the 
achievement of the internal market; nor did it give the latter a droit de regard, i.e. a right to be 
forwarded all draft decisions relating to legislation. How can the first comitology decision of 1987, the 
first real institutionalization of comitology, be accounted for under these new institutional conditions? 
Under the changed formal institutional rules of the SEA we would expect the Commission to be 
considerably more willing than in the previous period to argue for limitations on member state 
oversight and the comitology system. The Parliament would continue to be strongly opposed to 
comitology, and to delegation more generally. The Council, in contrast, would continue to prefer 
strong controls over delegated authority. Further, we would predict that both the Parliament and 
Commission would have greater bargaining strength vis-à-vis the Council in arguments over the 
institutions governing the legislative process and the politics of delegation than previously. The 
Council would no longer be able to use its effective veto power completely to dominate the 
development of the legislative and delegation processes, while the Commission, through presenting 
proposals to a Council that did not rely on unanimity, and the Parliament, through the cooperation 
procedure, would be able to use their veto power to bargain with the Council over the shape of 
legislative and delegation politics. The Parliament, long the weakest player in this game, now not only 
had new formal legislative powers under cooperation, but also had an enhanced role in the budgetary 
process
26 as well as a new ability to use the consultation procedure to impede the adoption of 
legislation.
27  
Debates over delegation were spurred by the SEA’s requirement that the Commission present a 
proposal for a Council Regulation defining the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers of 
the Commission. The Commission’s proposal aimed to simplify the Byzantine system, which in 1986 
involved some 30 procedures and 310 committees. This multiplication of comitology procedures 
illustrated the degree to which delegation had become an established form of European policy 
making—but it also demonstrated how delegated authority could generate its own problems. Therefore 
the Commission suggested that the Council should in future only be able to choose between a limited 
number of committee procedures: advisory, management and regulatory committee procedures.
28 
Initially, the Commission pressed for a formal commitment that internal market matters would be 
subject only to advisory committees. This, however, encountered strong opposition from the member 
states and culminated in a non-binding declaration of the Commission urging member states to use 
advisory committees in internal market matters.
29 Neither did it pursue the Parliament’s demand for a 
droit de regard. 
The Parliament was furious. It continued to view the comitology system as an interference with the 
appropriate institutional balance, which allowed the Council to undermine the Parliament’s purported 
role of supervising the Commission.
30 In a report by the Parliament’s Political Affairs Committee,
31 
and subsequent debate on the Commission’s proposal, the Parliament articulated a maximalist agenda. 
It demanded that all Commission draft measures should be forwarded to the Parliament and that the 
latter should be involved through consultation in instances in which the Council ‘took back’ power Legislate or Delegate? Bargaining over Implementation and Legislative Authority in the European Union 
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through comitology; that the regulatory committee procedure should be eliminated, and that 
precedence should be given to advisory committees in internal market questions. Even though the 
Commission considered Parliament’s demands to be unrealistic and imprudent, complaining that 
Parliament ‘always want[ed] the maximum,’
32 it eventually acquiesced to many of Parliament’s 
demands in a revised proposal. This was most probably spurred by the Parliament’s threat to withhold 
its opinion and thus delay the proposal from going forth if changes were not forthcoming. The 
Commission’s revised proposal included the Parliament’s demand that the advisory committee 
procedure be given a predominant place in the field of the internal market and that the procedures of 
existing committees should be adapted to the new arrangement.
33 It also offered a unilateral 
commitment to comprehensively inform and consult the Parliament regarding draft implementation 
measures submitted to committees. As a result, the Parliament resumed its interrupted consideration of 
the proposal and delivered its opinion. 
However, the Council, in its ‘first comitology decision’, proved entirely unreceptive to the 
more ambitious demands presented in the revised proposal. It chose the form of a Decision 
instead of a Regulation as proposed by the Commission.
34 Moreover, it excluded existing 
comitology procedures from the new rules. It also opted for a case by case approach to 
choosing committee procedures, which would preserve the flexible nature of implementing 
powers. Finally, the Council widened the set of basic committee procedures, and included 
additional and restrictive variants to the management, regulatory committee procedures as 
well as the safeguard procedure.
35  
The Commission deplored this decision (Corbett 1998: 258), but declined to withdraw the 
proposal, as was its right. Instead, it took a strategic procedural step and did not include the 
more restrictive variants of the regulatory and safeguard procedure in its proposal, thus 
forcing the Council to make formal amendments on the basis of unanimity. It also sought—
unsuccessfully—to take action in the European Court of Justice in order to expand its powers 
in the budgetary realm. Finally, it produced two reports criticizing the Council for failing to 
live up to its promise to emphasize the advisory procedure for Internal Market issues, and for 
continuing to employ the contre-filet mechanism to the detriment of efficiency in the 
decision-making process. 
The Parliament, which had less to lose than the Commission, took a far stronger stance. It 
used its powers under the consultation and cooperation procedures systematically to advocate 
less restrictive committee procedures in proposed legislation (Bradley 1997; Corbett 1998). 
However, while it could present its opinion to the Council and could delay this presentation, 
the Council had little reason to take any heed of it.
36 Further, while the Parliament had some 
powers to delay legislation, these were limited over time by a succession of ECJ decisions. 
The Court proved unwilling to engage with the thorny issues of delegation and institutional 
prerogatives, and declined to support Parliament’s contentions. 
In contrast, the Parliament was more successful in gaining ground in bilateral demands 
made upon the Commission, which had promised the Parliament information and consultation 
on matters placed before committees in the comitology system. The Parliament-Commission 
negotiations in which the Parliament could use delaying tactics and budget competences as a 
bargaining chip, culminated in the so-called Plumb-Delors agreement between Parliament and 
Commission, which stated as a general rule that all draft decisions relating to legislative 
documents should be forwarded to the Parliament at the same time that they were forwarded 
to the committees (Bradley 1997). In this agreement, the Parliament had for the first time 
obtained a formal concession to its long-standing demand for a droit de regard. However, the 
Commission did not live up to its promises, leading to further criticism from Parliament, and 
a subsequent set of commitments formalized in the Klepsch-Millan Agreement of 1993. Carl-Fredrik Bergström, Henry Farrell and Adrienne Héritier 
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The empirical account of the development of the delegation rules in this period only offers partial 
support for our assumptions regarding the preferences for legislation over delegation, and our 
hypotheses regarding the interstitial shift of power. The Commission was more prepared than it was in 
the period of the Luxembourg compromise to advocate a weakening of comitology—but clearly would 
have been prepared to back down if the Parliament had not forced it to take a maximalist line. This is 
contrary to our predictions. The Parliament, did, as we predicted continue to strongly prefer legislation 
to delegation, and to demand changes to the delegation process that would have made it considerably 
less attractive to the Council (and thus, by extension, less likely to be frequently employed). It argued 
more vigorously for limitations on comitology than the Commission did—it had less reason to 
compromise—because it wished not only to minimize member state control over delegation, but 
wished to minimize the extent of delegation itself. The Council, as expected, continued to prefer 
strong controls over comitology. 
The bargaining over the first comitology decision shows that the new veto power gained by the 
Parliament for the first time allowed it to exercise some moderate influence over the circumstances 
under which delegation took place. The Commission had to take account of Parliament’s aspirations in 
a way that it had not done previously, creating two informal (i.e. non-justiciable) agreements, and 
paving the way for more substantial future gains by the Parliament. However, contrary to our 
expectations, neither Parliament nor Commission seemed to have substantially increased bargaining 
strength vis-à-vis the Council, which continued largely to ignore the demands made by the other two 
decision-makers in shaping the first comitology decision.  
From the Maastricht Treaty to the Amsterdam Treaty 
The fourth phase provided the Parliament and Commission with new opportunities to seek to revise 
the procedures governing comitology. The formal institutional setting was redefined by the new Treaty 
of the European Union. The Commission presented an ambitious proposal: to introduce a hierarchy of 
legal acts. Under this proposal, the adoption of laws would have been reserved to the Council and the 
Parliament, the adoption of regulations and decisions to the Commission. However, member states had 
not taken up the Commission’s proposal in their Maastricht negotiations, although they had 
acknowledged the need to reform comitology in yet another projected Intergovernmental Conference 
in 1996. But even if the Maastricht Treaty left comitology untouched, it had substantial indirect effects 
on the subsequent debate, through the new codecision procedure. The Parliament had become a co-
legislator, able to block legislation, with a quite substantial increase in its veto power (Farrell and 
Héritier 2003). 
Under these new formal institutional conditions we would expect the Council to have had a 
somewhat diminished preference for legislation because the Parliament had become a co-legislator in 
some areas. It would have continued to insist on strong controls over the Commission’s role in 
delegation, via comitology. The Commission would have continued to try to fend off the control of 
member states in comitology. The Parliament’s preferences would have been straightforward: it would 
have greatly preferred legislation under codecision to delegation. 
In trying to specify the terms of the application of the new treaty provisions, the newly 
self-confident Parliament demanded in a Resolution that the Council would no longer be able 
to claim an exclusive competence over political supervision of Commission implementation 
of legislation falling under codecision, that the Parliament should have a role in comitology, 
and that there was a consequent need to reform the provisions governing comitology. In the 
meantime only consultative committees consisting of national experts assessing the impact of 
the decisions in the various national and local systems should be allowed. Moreover, the 
Parliament claimed a legal right to full information about implementing ‘legislation’, as well 
as a mechanism to cancel such legislation. Legislate or Delegate? Bargaining over Implementation and Legislative Authority in the European Union 
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While the Commission responded favourably to this proposal, the Council was unwilling to share 
its supervision of implementing powers. As a consequence the Parliament launched an offensive, 
seeking to force the Council to take the Parliament seriously. Being a co-legislator under the 
codecision process, it used its power to block legislation in order to gain concessions on comitology. 
The issue was fought out on each individual item of legislation (Corbett 1998: 258). The first case was 
the Open Voice Telephony Directive in which the Commission had proposed the relatively weak 
advisory committee procedure and was supported by the Parliament in its opinion. The Council 
changed the procedure to a regulatory committee procedure to allow it greater control. In a second 
opinion the Parliament requested that the original advisory committee procedure be reinstated, and 
demanded a recognition of the Parliament’s droit de regard and a substitution mechanism. Neither of 
these amendments were accepted by the Council (nor were the last two accepted by the Commission)
37 
leading to a meeting of the Conciliation Committee, a procedure through which Parliament and 
Council resolve differences over codecision dossiers. The Conciliation Committee ended in a 
deadlock, so that the Council reintroduced its initial proposal, which in turn was rejected by an 
absolute majority of the Parliament in 1994. 
After this showdown, the Commission began to take the Parliament’s demand for a droit de regard 
more seriously, as it desired to avoid future blockages of legislation. At the same time the Commission 
sought to use the Parliament’s intransigence to its benefit in the dispute over comitology. It presented 
a draft inter-institutional agreement to be adopted by the Council and the Parliament which provided 
for the use of generally defined committee procedures in the area of codecision. This document made 
a key distinction between legislative and non-legislative measures. The former were to be submitted to 
an advisory committee and the Parliament, the latter to the less restrictive variants of the advisory and 
management committee procedures. Not surprisingly, the Council rejected the draft, arguing that there 
was no need for an inter-institutional agreement and that Art. 145 EC applied to all Council acts, 
including those adopted in accordance with the codecision procedure. 
However, in contrast to previous junctures, the Council could not ignore the Parliament entirely. 
Not only did the Parliament have a new veto power over codecision; it also showed its willingness to 
use more traditional means of taking indirect influence by using its budget authority to put comitology 
funds ‘into reserve’. The Council therefore agreed on a so-called ‘modus vivendi’ which met some of 
the demands of the Parliament for greater information: Parliamentary committees should be sent any 
draft of an implementing act submitted to the committees and the time table for it. Furthermore, under 
the modus vivendi, the Parliament would be informed when a measure was taken that was not in 
accordance with its opinion, and due account should be given to the Parliament’s point of view. For 
the first time ever, the Council had entered into a direct responsibility towards the Parliament with 
respect to comitology. Having gained these concessions, the Parliament was willing to allow the Open 
Network Directive on voice telephony, which it had previously rejected, to pass.  
Even so, this only met some of Parliament’s less far-reaching demands. To underline its 
seriousness, the Parliament resumed its previous practice of trading short term substantive policy gains 
against mid- and long term institutional gains, sacrificing, for instance, the successful adoption of the 
regulation of financial services in order to underline its demand for more institutional power over 
comitology. Almost three years after the draft legislation had been presented, it was rejected by the 
Parliament because the Council insisted that the Commission should use the regulatory committee 
procedure. The Parliament furthermore sought to extend the ‘modus vivendi’ beyond codecision to 
consultation and cooperation, applying its time-honoured tactic of delaying decisions by postponing 
votes and insisting on re-consultation, whenever amendments were introduced by the Council. Thus in 
the case of the Council Directive on Ambient Air Quality Assessment and Management, the 
Parliament took two years to deliver its final opinion. When it finally approved the proposal it was 
only under the condition that the regulatory committee procedure be replaced by an advisory 
committee procedure. However, the Council subsequently ignored the amendments.  Carl-Fredrik Bergström, Henry Farrell and Adrienne Héritier 
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The Parliament’s resort to delaying tactics increasingly led both the Council and Commission to try 
to take issues out of the reach of Parliament, by declaring them to be a matter of delegation, not 
legislation. This, in turn, led the Parliament to try to set limits to the Council and the Commission’s 
ability to choose whether to deal with policy through legislation or delegation by seeking a ruling from 
the ECJ. In 1980 (the Isoglucose ruling) the Court had ruled that the participation of the Parliament in 
the legislative process was ‘an essential factor in the institutional balance’ and an ‘essential formality’ 
which—if not observed—meant that the legislation in question was void. Several rulings in the 1990s 
confirmed this principle
38. However, when the Parliament started to make active use of its new right
39 
to protect its interests with increased applications before the Court, the latter began to set limits to its 
previous rulings, making it clear that it was not prepared to support the Parliament’s expanded use of 
delay as a means of winning institutional concessions. It stated that the European Parliament was not 
entitled to complain when legislation was adopted before it had stated an opinion if it had failed to 
discharge its obligation to co-operate sincerely with the Council.
40  
More pertinently, in a number of key rulings the Court defined the balance between 
implementation and legislation in such a way as to encourage rather than prevent the Council and the 
Commission from circumventing the Parliament, by allowing important matters to be dealt with in 
annexes as matters of implementation.
41 The Court not only confirmed the legality of concrete 
measures that were clearly designed to circumvent the Parliament, but also provided the Council and 
the Commission with a weapon for the future. 
Even though the Parliament had gained ground through the creation of the inter-institutional 
agreement, the Commission failed to fully live up to its obligations under the droit de regard. Only a 
little more than a third of the relevant measures were transmitted to the Parliament. In response to this 
the Parliament applied another of its sanctioning instruments and in 1994 placed 90% of the proposed 
funding for committees in reserve while demanding that the Commission prepare a report on 
committee activities.
42 The Commission swiftly met this requirement, but then again failed to comply 
to the satisfaction of the Parliament, which continued to consign expenditure for committees to the 
budgetary reserve. The controversy finally led to a new inter-institutional agreement (the Samland-
Williamson Agreement), which in large part answered the Parliament’s demands.
43  
Thus, in light of our narrative account it is clear that the Parliament began to use its new bargaining 
power under codecision to try to shift the rules of delegation by insisting on its veto power in related 
areas. This resulted in several new informal rules—the modus vivendi, the interinstitutional agreement 
on comitology, and the concessions made by the Council regarding a droit de regard of the Parliament 
in matters relating to comitology.  
What our account would not have predicted ex ante is that the Council and the Commission 
partially responded to the Parliament’s assertiveness and willingness to block legislation by opting for 
an increased use of delegation under conditions that made it difficult for the Parliament to exercise 
influence. The Court, to which the Parliament turned to restrict these attempts, ruled in favour of the 
Council and the Commission, thus rendering the Parliament’s threats with regard to comitology less 
credible than they might otherwise have been, and signalling to the Parliament that there were clear 
limits to its ability to use its blocking and veto powers to pursue its aims. 
From the Amsterdam Treaty to the Second Comitology Decision  
In the last period under scrutiny the initial formal institutional conditions were again very different 
than in the previous period. Codecision and qualified majority voting had been extended; a hierarchy 
of legal acts, however, had not been established. The Reflection Group that had been established to 
prepare the negotiations had opposed the introduction of a hierarchy of legal acts and the granting of 
executive powers to the Commission, calling instead for simplified committee procedures and 
stressing the need to revise the Comitology decision of 1987. In practice, this recommendation meant 
that the Commission’s implementing powers should be taken from the IGC agenda and be dealt with Legislate or Delegate? Bargaining over Implementation and Legislative Authority in the European Union 
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through a mere Decision. Reflecting the dominant views of governments, the Amsterdam Treaty had 
on the one hand strengthened the Parliament by giving it the right to approve the appointment of the 
President of the Commission and by extending the codecision procedure, but on the other hand not 
granting it any new rights regarding implementing powers. Member states had followed the Reflection 
Group’s recommendations and had decided only to revise the Comitology Decision of 1987.  
The bargaining process surrounding the new Decision started off with a Commission proposal in 
1998, which sought to simplify the existing committee system and make it more open to parliamentary 
control. It proposed systematic criteria for choosing one committee procedure over another, linking 
them to the scope and quality of the measures to be taken. Such criteria would also have had important 
implications for the distinction between legislation and implementation. Unsurprisingly, the 
Commission proposed a very wide notion of executive authority that would have maximized its 
control of the implementation process. Additionally it proposed a modification of the regulatory 
committee procedure, according to which a draft implementing measure that was not explicitly 
approved by the regulatory committee could be transformed into a proposal within the normal 
legislative process. The Commission also included the droit de regard of the Parliament and suggested 
that the Parliament be kept informed of committees’ work (including agendas and voting results) in 
areas under codecision. However, the Commission perceived a clash between some of the 
Parliament’s demands and its own interests. Although it had previously shown some sign of support 
for a ‘substitution mechanism’ which would enable the Council and the Parliament to repeal an 
implementing measure, in its proposal it opted for an entirely different solution.  
Again, the Parliament sought to use its powers of delay in order to win concessions. In its response, 
the Aglietta Report, it did not submit the necessary opinion under the consultation procedure, but 
instead adopted a Resolution. According to the Parliament, the Commission proposal would allow too 
many matters of legislative bearing to be adopted in the form of implementing measures, upsetting the 
institutional balance. It stated that the Parliament and Council should have an equal share in control 
over executive activity.
44  
As before, the Parliament sought to exploit its powers to delay and to veto in order to press 
Commission and Council to accede to its requests. However, it was less credibly able to deliver on this 
threat than in previous junctures; the Parliament was as keen on reform as the other parties. It therefore 
in 1999 resorted to its second instrument of pressure, its partial control over the budget, and put part of 
the comitology funding in reserve, demanding the complete abolition of the regulatory committee 
procedure, a limitation of the substantive scope of implementing measures, the introduction of a 
mechanism for ‘protection of the legislative sphere’ consisting of a right to revoke a decision within 
codecision, and the right ‘to blow the whistle’ in other spheres. As it happened this second ‘Aglietta 
Report’ and the draft Resolution were debated on the same day that the Parliament voted on the 
approval of the nomination of the new Commission President Romano Prodi.  
The new Commission supported the Parliament in all its demands except one, a legally binding 
mechanism for the protection of the legislative prerogative. Instead the Commission only opted for a 
right to ‘blow the whistle’. However, the Council refused to make any concessions. Given Council 
intransigence, the Parliament openly threatened to use all available means of pressure to force the 
Council to be more conciliatory. It withheld its opinion from the second comitology decision: ‘I warn 
the Council… if the working group continues to be so restrictive on Parliament’s rights to intervene, 
then there will be no agreement and we will continue in legislative procedure after legislative 
procedure to block the comitology measures… and we will be very restrictive on voting the budgets 
and the credits to allow comitology-type committees to continue to meet. We are not seeking to take 
powers to ourselves to intervene in the detail, but we are seeking to have the safeguard.(…) It is the 
principle on which we will insist and unless agreement is reached in this matter, I can tell Council that 
co-decision procedure after co-decision procedure will have to go all the way to conciliation and time 
after time there will be difficulty on this problem.’
45  Carl-Fredrik Bergström, Henry Farrell and Adrienne Héritier 
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The Commission sought to intermediate between the Parliament and Council, proposing a 
compromise in which the Council would accept a mechanism for the protection of the legislative 
sphere if the Parliament in turn would accept regulatory committees. The Parliament conceded that 
regulatory procedures would be acceptable if the contre-filet  double safety-net procedure was 
abandoned. When this concession was made, it was willing to deliver its opinion, allowing the Council 
to decide on an instrument, the so-called Second Comitology Decision.
46 Three features of the Second 
Comitology Decision are worthy of particular note. The Council accepted a limited simplification of 
the management and regulatory committee procedures, but refused to abolish the more restrictive 
variants. Under the new regulatory committee procedure the committee has to approve a draft measure 
before the Commission can adopt it. If it does not, the Commission has to submit a proposal which the 
Council can adopt or oppose by qualified majority. The Commission can resubmit a modified proposal 
should the Council oppose the proposal,—or present a new proposal within the normal legislative 
process. Against the wishes of the Commission and the Parliament, the Council authorized the 
continuation of the old procedures, but conceded that there should be a case by case adjustment of the 
old ones. The message was clear: if parliamentarians did not behave themselves the adjustment would 
immediately be discontinued. 
The Commission’s proposal regarding the modification of the regulatory committee procedure was 
accepted. Additionally, the Parliament was granted the right ‘to blow the whistle’ if it felt that a draft 
implementing measure exceeded the powers conferred upon the Commission. The Commission would 
have to re-examine the measure in the light of the parliamentary position.
47 As regards the division of 
legislative and executive spheres, the Council preferred flexibility and accepted only a set of non-
mandatory criteria. The Council retained complete flexibility with regard to the advisory committee 
procedure. 
All the demands of the Parliament for increased transparency were met. The precise conditions 
were defined in the Fontaine/Prodi inter-institutional agreement. This also included a provision that 
the Commission should forward draft implementing measures which, although not adopted under the 
codecision procedure, were of particular importance to the European Parliament. 
In sum, the period from Amsterdam to the second comitology decision again supports our claim 
that, given formal decision-making rules, actors strategically use their negotiation resources to try to 
change the delegation rules according to their preferences. The Parliament was determined to apply all 
available means of pressure to induce the Council to reconsider their views and negotiate a new 
Comitology Decision. While the Council had to give up the contre-filet mechanism, the Parliament for 
its part had to accept the regulatory committee procedure. Additionally, the Commission issued a 
unilateral statement (the so-called ‘aerosol declaration’) in which it declared that if the Council was 
prepared to abandon the contre-filet procedure, the Commission would not go against a majority 
opinion of the Council.
48 
Conclusion 
Evidence drawn from interorganizational debates over comitology over the last five decades 
suggests that actors’ preferences are indeed drawn from governing institutions, and bargaining 
mechanism is a key mechanism explaining outcomes, just as our account would lead one to expect. 
There is strong evidence that the actors in these debates (in particular the Parliament), are competence 
maximizers, willing to trade short term losses in policy in return for possible long term increases in 
their institutional ability to influence policy. This is, in itself, an unremarkable finding—however, it 
runs counter to the basic claims of much existing work on the European Union, which treats these 
actors as interested only in one-shot interactions over policy. Second, there is considerable evidence 
that the preferences of these actors are less straightforward than previous work would suggest 
(Ballman et al. 2002). In particular, the relationship between Parliament and Commission is quite 
complex—while they both wish to minimize the control of member states over delegation, the Legislate or Delegate? Bargaining over Implementation and Legislative Authority in the European Union 
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Parliament, unlike the Commission, has historically wished to minimize delegation tout court, but then 
also has sought to get a say in comitology, leading it at times to advocate more extreme reforms of 
comitology than the Commission (which has been more prepared to make concessions to member 
states in order to allow delegation to continue). 
More pertinently, the historical evolution of the comitology debate provides strong evidence that 
the bargaining strength of actors depends on their effective power to block or veto legislation. This 
means that the Council has always maintained a privileged role—especially given the unwillingness of 
the European Court of Justice to limit its control over comitology—but that the practical effect of this 
privilege on its ability to bargain successfully with Commission and Parliament has varied over time, 
together with institutional changes that have affected the bargaining strength of the other two actors. In 
particular, changes in voting within the Council, and changes in the effective veto power of the 
Parliament have affected the preferences for legislation/delegation and bargaining strength of the 
Commission and Parliament respectively. In periods where unanimity voting applied, especially the 
period of the Luxembourg compromise, the Commission was both unwilling and unable to demand 
serious concessions on comitology from the Council. Unwilling—because it saw comitology as the 
necessary cost for having any influence over policy whatsoever, given blockages in the legislative 
procedure, and unable, because it had difficulties in making credible threats. There is evidence that 
this has changed in the wake of the Single European Act, so that the Commission has been 
increasingly willing over time to push for less member state control over its implementing powers, 
culminating in the European Constitutional Treaty (not described in this article), which would, if it 
were ratified, provide a hierarchy of legal acts that would greatly increase the implementing powers of 
the Commission. 
There is even stronger evidence that changes in the Parliament’s ability to threaten the delay or 
veto of legislation over time have increased its bargaining strength considerably. Parliament’s 
fundamental preferences have remained unchanged (although we predict that they would change if 
Parliament were to achieve its goal of equal control with the Council over implementation. Parliament 
would then be much more amenable to delegation and implementation). As Parliament’s ability to 
make credible threats has increased, from an almost entirely passive ability to influence, through its 
ability to use consultation to delay legislation, to its increasing influence over legislation through 
cooperation and codecision, so too has its ability to wrest concessions from Commission and Council 
over comitology. Furthermore, we see how these processes of bargaining may sometimes lead to the 
creation of new informal institutions. However, we note that the Parliament has had far less success in 
pushing for the creation of informal institutions that favour it in comitology than in codecision, and 
that indeed, more generally, there is a much ‘thinner’ informal institutionalization of delegation than 
of many aspects of legislation. The Parliament has been markedly less successful in establishing 
control over comitology than it has been in creating informal institutions that instantiate its influence 
over legislation under codecision. This is largely because the formal Treaty texts provide far less scope 
for creative reinterpretation than do the texts governing legislative decision-making. The Treaty not 
only clearly emphasizes the role of the Council, but provides little in the way of effective constraints 
on the Council’s ability to pick and choose comitology procedures. 
Finally, we note that the developments that we describe are leading to a new set of battles, which 
are poorly described, if at all, in the current literature. As the Parliament has gained increasing 
influence in the legislative process, the Council and Commission have sought to circumvent 
Parliament by resorting to implementation as much as possible, dealing with sensitive matters not in 
the legislation itself, which is subject to Parliamentary control, but in implementation procedures set 
out in the legislative Annexes. This is leading to a new set of disputes over the delimitation of the 
spheres of legislation and delegation, which will be complicated further still by the new Constitution, 
if it should enter into force. We predict that these disputes too will be characterized by the factors that 
we discuss in this article: efforts by actors to maximize their competences, arguments that reflect this 
particular form of institutional self-interest, and results that are largely determined by actors’ Carl-Fredrik Bergström, Henry Farrell and Adrienne Héritier 
18  EUI-WP RSCAS No. 2006/42 © 2006 Carl-Fredrik Bergström, Henry Farrell and Adrienne Héritier 
respective bargaining strength, which in turn will reflect their respective ability credibly to threaten 
delay or veto. Legislate or Delegate? Bargaining over Implementation and Legislative Authority in the European Union 
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ENDNOTES 
* We would like to thank the Swedish Institute for European Policy Research in Stockholm for the generous funding of our 
research’ 
1   We are focusing here on legislative delegation and not executive delegation measures in the strict sense, as distinguished 
in Art. 36 and 37 of the Constitutional Treaty. 
2   While the European Court of Justice (ECJ) also plays an important role, it is an indirect one; the ECJ interprets the Treaty 
and may adjudicate disputes over competences between the other legislative actors.  
3   In contrast to a normal legislative proposal, the Council has no right to be consulted. 
4   See Bates et al. (2000). The method of analytic narratives has been criticized (e.g. Elster 2000) for not paying sufficient 
attention to the sources of actors’ preferences; we seek to address this objection through our argument that actors’ 
preferences in any given period are a function of the given formal institutional structures governing legislation and 
delegation. 
5   Our analysis builds on the detailed research of Bergström; for a more detailed account, see Bergström (2005).  
6   We note that we do not examine the ability of argument itself to reshape politics. 
7   Bulletin EEC 5-1959. 
8   A bargaining process need not be around a table, but can also be conceived of as a more loose strategic interaction 
between actors (Sebenius 1992). 
9   Bulletin EEC 5-1960. p. 39, 
10  Résolution (157) du 20 décembre 1961 EEC (OJ 1962 C 72/62), or Annuaire-Manuel 1961-62, pp. 468-69. 
11    Rapport général sur l’activité de la Communauté économique européenne (rapporteur: Arved Deringer), PE Doc 
74/1962-63, 5 October 1962.  
12  The crisis began with the Commission’s proposals on financing of the CAP in March 1965. The Commission proposed 
that not only agricultural levies, but also customs duties should be treated as ‘own resources,’ to be spent at the 
Community, rather than member state level. Although the Commission had tried to win French support through a 
favorable allocation of spending, the French government was incensed, and withdrew from both Council sessions and the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives.  
13  De Gaulle complained that the Commission wished to become a ‘great independent financial power,’ and that ‘those very 
states, having fed these enormous amounts to it…, would have no way of supervising it.’ (Le Monde, 10 Sep 1965; 
translation in Lambert (1966: 214-216)). 
14  Bulletin EEC 3-1966, pp. 6-7. 
15  In a draft of COREPER that gave substance to the Luxembourg Compromise, a ‘method’ was envisaged, according to 
which Council and Commission would together specify the implementing powers that the Council could delegate, and 
what the future role of the management committees would be. However, after a number of governments observed that 
delegation of implementing powers was the business of the Council alone, and did not need to be discussed with the 
Commission, this section was deleted. (Process-verbal Luxembourg, 17-18 et 27-28 janvier 1966, Conseil of the CEE, no 
C/12 f/66 (AE 1) final, pp. 28 and 71. 
16  Resolution of 9 March 1966 (OJ 1966 769/66). 
17  See Council Regulation 802/68/EEC of 27 June 1968 (OJ 1968 L 148/1); see also Council Regulation 803/68/EEC of 27 
June 1968 (OJ 1968 L 148/6). 
18  See below for evidence. 
19    The most important is the so-called Jozeau-Marigné report, Legal Committee, Report on procedures for the 
implementation of secondary Community law (rapporteur Jozeau-Marigné), EP Doc No 115/1968-69, 30 September 
1968. 
20  OJ 1968 C 108/37. See also Europe 3 October 1968. 
21  Quoted in Europe 3 October 1968. While Rey promised the Parliament that the Commission would not accept the 
application of the contre-filet in future measures, the Commission itself proposed such a mechanism in a new area shortly 
thereafter (see ‘Editorial Comments’, Common Market Law Review 7, (1970). 
22  Bulletin EC, Supplement 1/76, pp. 31 and 33. 
23  Bulletin EC, Supplement 2/78. 
24  Bulletin EC 11-1979, p. 47. 
25  Fresco Report 1978 Legislate or Delegate? Bargaining over Implementation and Legislative Authority in the European Union 
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26  The Parliament’s budgetary powers were increased by the ‘Budgetary Powers’ treaty of 22 July 1975. In 1978 the class 
of non-obligatory expenditure in which the Parliament has a say constituted over 20% of the budget.  
27  The right to be consulted allowed the Parliament to delay legislation indefinitely according to one reading of the ECJ’s 
ruling in the Isoglucose case; while this ruling’s implications were narrowed considerably in later judgments, it provided 
the Parliament with a potent means of effectively vetoing legislation for a considerable period.  
28  Commission Proposal of 3 March 1986 for a Council Regulation COM(86) 35 final (OJ 1986 C70/6). See Bulletin EC 1-
1986, point 2.4.6. See also Ehlermann (1988: 233) and Bradley (1992: 695). 
29  Apart from this attempt, the Commission did not propose rules determining which kind of committee should be used for 
fear that member states would substitute its own, harsher rules. House of Lords Paper 1986-87, Oral evidence by Claus-
Dieter Ehlermann, at paragraph 83 (p. 19).  
30  See the Report on the Proposal from the Commission of the European Communities to the Council for a Regulation 
laying down the Procedures for the Exercise of Implementing Powers Conferred on the Commission (rapporteur: Klaus 
Hänsch), Political Affairs Committee, EP Doc. A 2-78/86, 2 July 1986.  
31  Ibid. 
32  Speech of Jacques Delors to Parliament, in Debates of the European Parliament of 9 July 1986 (OJ 1986 Annex No 2-
341, p. 155). 
33  See the amended Commission Proposal of 3 December 1986 for a Council Regulation COM(86) 702 final. 
34  Under a Decision the addressees are not national administrations, and no rights are conferred on individuals. 
35  The safeguard procedures do not require the use of a committee. The Council gives the Commission the powers to 
introduce safeguard measures. The latter should notify the Council of its decision to introduce such measures. The 
Council can stipulate that the Commission, before adopting its decision, must consult member states. Any member state 
can refer the decision to the Council. Then, either the decision of the Commission continues to apply unless the Council 
by qualified majority has not taken a different decision, or the measure is deemed to be revoked if the Council has not 
acted within a limited period.  
36  Interviews with officials in Council Secretariat (October 2001). 
37  The Commission rejected a supervisory role of the Parliament with respect to the exercise of the implementing powers. It 
felt that any changes in comitology procedures should be covered by an inter-institutional agreement, and it considers it 
inappropriate to consult the Parliament on technical issues. 
38  European Court of Justice (1980). Case 138/79 SA Roquette Frères v Council of the European Communities (ECR 3333), 
29 October 1980. 
39 The Maastricht Treaty for the first time in history had given the Parliament the right to bring cases to the ECJ. 
40  The Court also questioned the right of reconsultation of the Parliament in case of considerable changes in the text by 
excluding amendments relating to the type of committee procedure. 
41  In the case of the Council Regulation 2092/91/EEC on organic production of agricultural products the inclusion of 
GMMOs in the limitative list in the annex was not considered to go beyond the framework for implementation of the 
principles laid down by the basic regulation adopted following consultation of the Parliament . In another ruling of 1993 
(European Parliament vs. Council C-417/93) implementation was defined so widely as to permit provisions not in an 
Annex but in the main text of a Regulation adopted under a normal prcedure to be amended under a simplified procedure. 
A Commission proposal for a Council Regulation concerning technical assistance to economic reform and recovery in the 
independent states of the USSR and Mongolia (a follow up to the previous TACIS programme) was sent to the 
Parliament for consultation. The Parliament rejected the proposal because the Council decided to entrust the Commission 
with implementing powers on the basis of a regulatory committee procedure instead of a management committee 
procedure as chosen by the Commission. After the rejection, the Council adopted the proposal and added a 
supplementary procedure giving the Council the right to revise public contracts above a certain threshold of ECU 
(Council Regulation 2053/93/EEC/Euratom). The Parliament brought an action of anulment to the ECJ arguing that the 
EP’s prerogatives were undermined. The claim was rejected by the Court.  
42  This was underlined by a Resolution of the Parliament. 
43  Thus it was granted right of attendance at committee meetings. 
44  ‘In contrast to the Commission we believe that an implementing rule cannot be amended, udpated ur adapted, these being 
the key elements of the basic legislative acts, including the annexes, ...we know perfectly well that, very often, key 
elements of the legislation are dealt with in the annexes.’ (Report on the Proposal for a Council Decision laying down the Carl-Fredrik Bergström, Henry Farrell and Adrienne Héritier 
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Procedures for the Exercise of Implementing Powers Conferred on the Commission (rapporteur: Maria Adelaide 
Aglietta), Committee on Institutional Affairs, EP Doc A4-169/99, 24 March 1999)  
45  Corbett, Debates of EP, 5.5.1999  
46  After the adoption of Decision 1999/468/EC the Parliament released the appropriations it had withheld. 
47  The Commission can either submit a new draft measure, continue with the procedure or present a proposal for normal 
legislations 
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